The Complete Instigation Manual
Notes on the Night of Nov 20
We need to distinguish the nature of a madman burning down his own house—just as Schopenhauer distinguishes between starvation and ordinary suicide—from the act of calmly burning down one’s own house purely out of reason. We first demonstrate the correctness of this rational act; this is what I wrested from Schopenhauer’s hands. What will be discovered thereafter is the absolute rationality of this action.
Schopenhauer ignored the other side of suicide, namely the reverse manifestation of the denial of the will. Even though he mentioned in passing, “while they still feel guilty when enjoying harmless pleasures.” What Schopenhauer still ignored is the emergence of the other side of the denial of the will. Not every act that alleviates suffering is an affirmation of the will, for there obviously exist methods of suicide more painful and enduring than starvation, such as self-dismemberment during fasting? These means of increasing suffering are what Schopenhauer lavished praise upon. That historian ought to have destroyed his own eyes, for the eyes, as the best weapon of cognition, need to be annihilated by cognition, or rather, this is the self-sublation of cognition, like a warrior severing his own wrist. Only in this way is it proven that the power of cognition itself is sufficient to cancel the will. Thereby rendering himself more sanctified. Furthermore, should he not have committed suicide while sitting before a feast of delicacies? Otherwise, it is hard to say whether it was objective conditions that caused him to die of starvation; before the moment his cognition cancelled the will, he prematurely, passively, welcomed a painful death—perhaps he wanted to eat, but being in a desolate wilderness, a place where no one would find him for a month, there was simply nothing to eat. Thus, his holy fasting degenerates into the act of the madman taking poison in Schopenhauer’s eyes—the impurity of a slow death. From the above, one can see how incompetent the example raised by Schopenhauer is. This will further illustrate the non-existence of Schopenhauer’s transcendental transformation—that is, there is no empirical existence—thereby debating in favor of my view on suicide.
Another point I have long wanted to roast (since I cannot find the book now, I quote from my profound memory) is: “They (ascetics) may, due to extreme denial of the will, fall from snowy mountains or be crushed under carriage wheels. This is also their asceticism,” versus what he said in Section 67: “Nothing is closer to the denial of the will than starvation, this specific method of suicide. As if, while he starves, some noble voice were guiding him.” This is truly baffling. Why do you not condemn those monks who did not starve, but prematurely, through ordinary acts, committed suicide by shortening their suffering? You should not praise them. Unless, it is the insufficiency of your own theory that you realize deep in your heart—a psychological activity like Kant’s occurring within you—that manifests the defect of your theory. Schopenhauer only accepts starvation yet lavishes praise upon falling off cliffs; this is a direct embodiment of Schopenhauer’s contradiction. It is indirectly revealed in the impurity of the details of these acts, such as that historian—he actually ate something.
We reach a conclusion:
Schopenhauer made no realistic narrative regarding the ideal transcendental transformation. His irresponsibility and self-contradiction are embodied in Section 67. Like saintly virtue, that which is thoroughly devoid of the secular and cannot be acquired post-natally is not within this world.
Schopenhauer’s restriction on suicide flies out of the world here.
Transcendental transformation is like saintly virtue; since neither can be acquired subjectively, they are not within the world, because everything within the world can be acquired, that is, can be spoken of. Thus, this means that even passively accepting a transcendental transformation flying over suddenly becomes—just as the reader feels when reading this for the first time—something utterly mysterious and abstruse. The existence of a saint is not one in ten million, but zero.
Here, after Schopenhauer’s death, I begin the inquiry into rational suicide. First, it is worth emphasizing that denial is the absolute value in the will. In times of happiness—that is, when the will manifests just as crazily as it is constantly satisfied—this is also a good opportunity to kill the will. Unlike the general distinction between “laying down the butcher’s knife and becoming a Buddha on the spot” and the “eighty-one tribulations,” I believe the good person is already a Buddha. The remaining eighty-one tribulations he performs and endures are, on the contrary, meaningless deeds that agitate the will. Those eighty-one tribulations are, instead, what is worthy of guilt, just like food. Because the denial of the will is fundamentally an absolute value, not a numerical value. Wanting to train oneself not to fear bitterness, while being addicted to bitterness as if it were life, and yet 【unable to turn bitterness into something loved】, all of this is meaningless, a reverse agitation of the will. The suffering obtained from this is also meaningless and cannot suppress the will again. What is positive is fine food; their absolute values are fundamentally the same.
We need do nothing extra; under rational conditions, as long as we peacefully welcome death, we achieve that success of Lincq. He was not perfect. The perfect does not exist in the world or within the world, within our scope. Thus, 【after lifting the historian Lincq down (from atop Schopenhauer’s head)】, we possess the opportunity (right) to sit as equals with him.
My notes, in small parts, are deeply chaotic in thought, and difficult to express in those few words, like Kant. They require massive annotations, especially for supplementation and explanation.
Notes on the Morning of Nov 21
As an attempt to destroy the will through violence, contraception, in Schopenhauer’s view, is completely futile, just like what he calls suicide that eliminates the phenomenon. Does the will exist outside the individual, but does it exist inside the individual? Schopenhauer did not offer much rebuttal to contraception methods, an attempt similar to ordinary suicide. Because he could not provide a directly stated explanation here that violates logic. Regarding suicide, perhaps it is difficult for us to discuss. But regarding contraception methods, we can say with certainty—contraception is absolutely effective. As long as we are willing, we can, in this single sexual act, avoid the consequences caused by a lack of abstinence—provided the condom quality is up to standard. This means that the effectiveness of contraception, this low-level method, thoroughly proves the effectiveness of suicide. How perfect. The objective is effective; the objective is a means to assist our abstinence. Just as objective inability to satisfy can assist the stimulation of our reason—is this not abstinence? This is one point; secondly, this objectively limits the manifestation of action, that is, knowing it is impossible yet not doing it. Manifestation is the will.
Notes on Nov 22
Only the existence of natural law can ensure the logical existence of the future.
There is no necessity for the existence of a past life; we cannot explain our origin, our birth. Even if a past life exists, that is a higher-level ‘I’, just as this phenomenon of ‘me’ will not die after death, the higher-level ‘I’ will not die. As a phenomenon, I can explain nothing. The “higher level” here does not refer to “humanity”—in terms of superficial meaning, humanity will undoubtedly go extinct as well. Thus, the teacher’s explanation of Su Shi’s line “If observed from that which is immutable, then both the myriad things and I are inexhaustible” is merely delaying death, not solving the problem from the root. Because that is contradictory.
My purpose is to argue how to commit suicide in order to be happier after death.
I am almost a cult, almost anti-human. But my theory is based on humanism; everything is for the person, for the individual person, not for the happiness of the collective humanity—abandoning the individual for the whole is something only socialism does. Thus, with me, suicide as a practice of transferring pain is also permitted—because the pain is fundamentally not inflicted by the suicide, but generated spontaneously by you; the suicide merely fully defended his life. The right to suicide is the embodiment of respect for life.